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Abstract: The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 purports to 
move away from the identification doctrine, towards a genuinely organisational model of 
corporate liability. There is a risk, however, that insistence upon the involvement of senior 
management in corporate manslaughter will reduce the Act to doing no more than 
aggregating individual misconduct. Such an approach would fail both to encompass the 
culpability of the organisation as more than just a collection of individuals, and to offer an 
effective tool for the prosecution of large organisations. I argue that the senior management 
requirement should not be interpreted as focusing on individuals, but on the authoritative 
systems of work that organisations impose upon their employees. Inherent in large 
organisations is a corporate structure, determining the meaning and value of what 
employees perceive and the boundaries and direction of their work. These structures 
emerge from the involvement of senior managers, whose rank and role within organisations 
enables them to contribute to the development of corporate structure. Through insistence 
on the involvement of these corporate architects and surveyors, the 2007 Act may be seen 
to emphasise the role of the organisation in corporate manslaughter, identifying truly 
corporate culpability. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Who, or what, commits the crime of corporate manslaughter? Established legal doctrine 
dictates that the offence exists, yet at its core there is a fundamental dilemma. Does 
corporate liability arise because individual fault is transferred to the organisation, or is the 
organisation itself at fault? 
With the arrival of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
comes a new framework for holding organisations accountable. By expanding the 
application of corporate manslaughter beyond business corporations, the 2007 Act has 
brought issues of organisational fault into heightened focus. Corporate manslaughter 
carries newfound relevance to the operations of a diverse range of organisations, both 
private and public. Corporations, government departments, police forces, partnerships, 
trade unions and employers’ unions all fall within the scope of the 2007 Act.1 Corporate 
manslaughter is no longer a concept affecting simply business organisations. Questions of 
corporate liability have reached a newfound level of relevance and importance. 
However, the Act has failed to resolve the underlying question of whether 
individual or organisational fault is the basis of corporate liability. Instead, by demanding 
that senior management be a substantial element of corporate culpability, the new law has 
created room for confusion. There remains the possibility that corporate manslaughter has 
retained its focus on individual fault by simply allowing for its aggregation, leaving the 
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new statutory offence caught between a metaphorical and genuine acceptance of the 
organisation as independently blameworthy.2 
The common law of corporate manslaughter, with its insistence upon identifying 
one faulty individual, placed crippling restrictions on the offence. The new law aims to 
expand the reach of corporate liability for manslaughter, but with the ambiguity of the 
senior management requirement risks becoming wholly unhelpful in the prosecution of 
organisations. There is a need for clarity: do individuals commit corporate manslaughter 
by acting for the organisation, or can organisations commit manslaughter in their own 
right? 
If senior management is treated as nothing more than a collection of individuals, 
the 2007 Act represents little more than a shift from considering individual fault towards 
considering aggregated individual fault. If this is the case, then serious questions arise over 
whether the Act aggregates enough conduct by the right individuals. Such is the variability 
of job titles between organisations that it will often be unclear who the senior managers of 
an organisation are, and corporate members beyond senior management can play 
significant roles in corporate misconduct. 
Even if aggregated individual fault is considered in the absence of a senior 
management requirement, it will always be too narrow to capture the extent of fault 
involved in corporate liability. When actors are part of a group, individual innocence can 
collectively contribute to culpable consequences, particularly within the context of an 
organisation. Corporate environments can affect both the type, and impact, of individual 
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action within their bounds. Actors within an organisation may behave without fault, but 
the output of the organisation will still warrant blame and punishment. 
Individual fault, however aggregated, will never fully explain corporate culpability. 
Organisations will always add an additional dimension, and there is a corresponding need 
to characterise what organisations add to the picture. My suggestion is that the missing 
consideration has been the role of the organisation as an authoritative employer. Employer 
status has so far been used to attribute individual fault vicariously to organisations, but its 
importance reaches considerably further. Organisations, as employers, are authoritative, 
holding power and influence over their employees.3 They impose systems of work upon 
those employees, and inherent in these systems are structures that impose pressures and 
constraints upon members of the organisation. 4  Corporate structure determines the 
direction and boundaries of behaviour within its confines. 5  Through directing action, 
organisations attract attributions of fault and blame that, while arising out of individual 
action, are not dependent upon individual fault. Understood as imposing authoritative 
systems of employment, organisations become culpable in their own right. 
Importantly, though, not every pressure within an organisation originates in a 
corporate system of work. Structure presses down upon employees, but some dynamics 
emerge upwards: whether from dominant individuals, from subgroups or out of the mere 
existence of a group of individuals working within one environment.6 These bottom-up 
dynamics arise in the corporate context, but do not have their origins in the organisation 
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itself. Only the top-down constraints imposed by an organisation’s structure are truly 
corporate, and this places an important limit on corporate liability. In order to distinguish 
corporate structure from other dynamics that are incidental to organisational settings, we 
need to look to the location of the relevant processes. That which is truly corporate is that 
which has been embedded in the organisation. Embedment relies upon policies being 
introduced, encouraged or permitted by founders or senior members. 
While not limited by their initial design, corporate structures must always be built 
into the corporate entity. Behind corporate structures are corporate architects and surveyors 
who support this building process. The self-directing structures of an organisation find their 
origins in a process of adoption or acceptance by senior corporate members.7 It is at the 
point of identifying individual contributions that presuppose structure that the senior 
management requirement finds its importance. Only senior managers can contribute to 
corporate structure; corporate architects and surveyors necessarily operate at the upper 
echelons of organisations. Senior managers will always have a role in the formation of 
corporate structure, whether through explicit introduction, or active or passive acceptance. 
By insisting on the involvement of corporate architects and surveyors, the senior 
management requirement ensures only that which is truly corporate is attributed to the 
organisation. 
With the recognition of organisations’ authoritative systems and structures, it 
becomes possible to understand the 2007 Act as a coherent and effective means of holding 
organisations to account. The senior management requirement, previously considered 
overly restrictive and difficult to understand, takes on the function of a principled limit on 
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corporate liability, preventing its overextension into the domains of culture, subgroups, or 
dominant individuals. The basis for corporate manslaughter can be clearly understood: it 
reflects an organisational, rather than individual, fault. 
In what follows, I will in the second section provide a brief overview of the previous 
law of corporate manslaughter. Section 3 will offer an interpretation of the 2007 law as 
both a potential new beginning of organisational fault, and an arguably limited move 
towards liability based upon aggregated individual fault. This section will also consider the 
problems associated with an aggregative approach to corporate liability, and in an effort to 
avoid these difficulties I will in section 4 present an alternative approach. Organisations 
contain authoritative systems of work with corresponding corporate structures that have 
their roots in corporate architects and surveyors: senior managers. With this understanding, 
corporate manslaughter under the 2007 Act can operate as a conceptually coherent and 
practically functional basis of liability. 
 
2. Past Mistakes: the Identification Doctrine 
 
In the past, the law approached the transfer from individual to corporate liability through 
the use of the identification doctrine. The doctrine has its origins in the dependence of 
organisations on individual corporate members. Aside from being metaphysical fact, the 
reliance of organisations on individuals in order to act is legal doctrine: ‘[a] company is 
incapable of acting or speaking or even of thinking except in so far as its officers have 
acted, spoken, or thought’.8 
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On this approach, organisations were not simply incapable of independent action, 
but also independent thought. There could be no independent criminality by organisations. 
The result was that, for corporate liability to arise, there needed to be an individual who 
was the ‘directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the corporation’.9 
The central proposition of the identification doctrine is elicited from the case of 
Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass.10  At the core of the doctrine is the possibility for an 
individual within an organisation to become ‘an embodiment of the company’, such that 
‘his mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the 
company.’11 
Corporate liability was dependent upon the presence, or more often absence, of an 
individual who was the ‘directing mind and will’ of the organisation.12 The kernel of 
corporate liability was that one individual represented the organisation. When empowered 
with a sufficient amount of control over the operations of an organisation, such an 
individual was taken to act not just for, but also as that organisation. His mind, in directing 
those acts, was equated with the mind of the company, with the result that his acts and 
states of mind could be treated as corporate acts and states of mind.13 
The liability of the organisation, on this model, derived from the participation of 
that individual in corporate criminality. The person in question stood for the organisation, 
equated with the organisation, such that his or her misdeeds were attributable to the 
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organisation just as much as they were to the individual.14 Aggregation of fault was not 
permitted: in order for liability to arise under this doctrine, there needed to be one 
identifiable individual who could be equated with the organisation.15 Neither acts nor 
intention could be drawn from a group working together; the identification doctrine was 
concerned with only an individual, not individuals, who stood for the company. 
Organisations could not be liable without criminally liable acts by individuals. If 
individuals were not at fault, nor was the organisation. 16  Corporate criminal liability 
extended only so far as the acts of ‘the board of directors, the managing director and 
perhaps other superior officers of a company who carry out functions of management and 
speak and act as the company’.17 Individuals who constituted the directing mind and will 
of the organisation did not have to be formally defined as company directors, but 
nevertheless it remained necessary to identify individuals who had ‘management and 
control in relation to the act or omission’ that was the basis of liability.18 
The identification doctrine was a model of liability by proxy. The culpable acts at 
the heart of liability were always committed by an individual; they simply became 
corporate because of the importance of that individual within the organisation.19 Liability 
under the identification doctrine was a product of the power an individual had over an 
organisation. Individual behaviour was at the core of the doctrine; liability was 
individualist. 
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The insistence upon one directing individual, and the denial of aggregation, placed 
a significant practical limitation on corporate liability, for such an individual could only 
realistically be found in a small company.20 In order to attribute liability to an organisation 
for an act or omission, it was first ‘necessary to identify the natural person or person having 
management and control in relation to the act or omission in point’.21  Both the actus reus 
and the mens rea of manslaughter had to be established against that individual before the 
organisation could be deemed liable for manslaughter.22 
As a result, the identification doctrine was of little use as a means of holding 
organisations to account. It effectively precluded the prosecution of large organisations for 
corporate offences, which by their very size either prevented individuals from engaging in 
the thoughts or acts that the doctrine required, forcing the sharing of tasks between 
numerous individuals, or instead obscured individual action from view such that 
prosecution was impossible.23 It was simply unable to keep up with the reality of large 
organisations producing consequences that were far more than the product of one 
individual’s direction. 
This inability to respond to the reality of corporate misconduct had significant 
practical implications. In 1997 a Great Western Trains High Speed Train collided with a 
freight train in Southall, resulting in the deaths of seven passengers.24 The collision was a 
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consequence of the lone driver of the train packing his bag rather than looking for signals, 
and as a consequence missing two signals warning him of the train ahead.25 
The accident was caused by a driver not looking where he was going. Equally, 
however, such negligence was only able to have such catastrophic effects due to corporate 
negligence in the way the train was operated. The rules of Great Western Trains allowed 
for two independent safeguarding systems, either of which on their own could have 
prevented the accident, to be deactivated.26 At the time of the accident, one system was 
broken and the other inactive, consistent with the dominant practice within the company.27 
Nevertheless, the train ran without restriction at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour. 
Great Western Trains imposed no requirement to operate the train with safety 
measures in place, or with another driver present.28 The company’s rules for running the 
train rendered passenger safety dependent upon the concentration of one driver, without 
regard to the need to operate the train safely when travelling at such high speeds.29 Without 
this corporate negligence, the negligence of the individual driver would not have caused 
the accident. 
However, within Great Western Trains there was no individual who both embodied 
the company and committed gross criminal negligence.30 As a result, despite failings across 
the company, without which the disaster and the deaths would not have occurred, Great 
Western Trains was not liable for manslaughter. The only available option was recourse to 
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the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974: an approach with limited expressive force and 
practical effect that failed to respond to the seriousness of corporate killing.31   
Larger organisations such as Great Western Trains engage in misconduct that is 
truly corporate. Corporate manslaughter in such cases is a consequence of companywide 
failings. However, the size and internal practices of such organisations mask the individual 
contributions that were necessary for liability under the identification doctrine. 
Consequently, no large companies were convicted of corporate manslaughter prior to the 
introduction of the 2007 Act.32 
In small organisations, the distinction between the person running it and the 
organisation itself is often minimal, so prosecution was considerably easier. However, as 
prosecution becomes easier under an individualist model of liability, it also becomes 
increasingly pointless. 33  If there is little difference between the individual and the 
organisation, then there is little difference between individual and corporate liability. It 
became the case that corporate liability for manslaughter was only available when it was 
not needed. 
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3. Current Problems: Senior Management Failure, or Just the Failure of Senior 
Managers? 
 
The new law of corporate manslaughter arrived in 2007, in the form of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, coming into force the following year.34 It was 
preceded by more than a decade of widespread dissatisfaction over the law of corporate 
manslaughter, highlighted by high-profile tragedies that emphasised the disutility of the 
identification doctrine. One such event was the capsizing of the ferry Herald of Free 
Enterprise. Having travelled less than a mile from the entrance of Zeebrugge harbour, the 
Herald capsized, leading to the deaths of nearly 200 passengers and crew.35 The ship 
capsized because its bow doors were left open, the assistant bosun responsible for closing 
the doors asleep in his cabin.36 
Had the assistant bosun not slept through the call to ‘Harbour Stations’ and instead 
fulfilled his duties, the Herald would not have capsized when it did. There is no doubting 
his personal, very immediate, responsibility.37 However, as was discovered in a subsequent 
investigation by the Department of Transport, responsibility for the disaster spread far 
beyond one crew member, or even the crew as a whole. Mistakes and failures persisted not 
just across the crew of the Herald but throughout the operator of the ship, Townsend 
Thoresen. Sheen J, leading the Department of Transport investigation, stated that ‘from top 
to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness’.38 
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Culpability for the disaster at Zeebrugge was shared across the entirety of 
Townsend Thoresen, but no one individual was entirely to blame, such was the diffusion 
of fault. The result was that, despite the clear presence of a corporate fault, there could be 
no corporate liability, for there was no individual fault sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of the identification doctrine. Without liable individuals, there could be no liable 
organisation.39 
The 2007 Act was conceived and developed in the shadow of the inefficacy of the 
old law, as an attempt to establish a meaningful and useful corporate manslaughter liability. 
Under the new law, liability arises when the way in which the organisation’s activities are 
managed or organised causes a death.40 It represents at the very least a shift away from the 
individualist model that was represented by the identification doctrine.41 The test at the 
core of the new Act is one of ‘management failure’.42 Liability derives from the way in 
which activities are managed or organised – not from the activities of any one senior 
individual. Management, rather than any individual, must be at fault for liability to arise. 
The question then is whether management failure is treated as a species of organisational 
failure, or a failure by managers. 
 
A. Aggregating Individual Action into Management Failure 
If the 2007 Act was simply a test of management failure, then the question of whether 
liability arose from the organisation itself or from a group of individuals would be 
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considerably more straightforward. However, while earlier incarnations of the new 
approach to corporate manslaughter were models of management failure, the final form of 
the Act adds an additional layer of complexity. 
The history of the Act has been of a focus on organisational failure. Previous 
proposals for reform of the corporate manslaughter offence focused on the failure of the 
organisation as a system, rather than failures by individuals within that system. 43 
Management failure was explicitly a failing of the organisation, with corporate 
manslaughter committed by the organisation itself rather than any individual within it.44 
The notion of requiring an individual to stand as a proxy for the organisation was removed 
from consideration, with attention firmly focused upon the organisation as a free-standing 
entity. 
As enacted, the 2007 law seems to potentially change the focus of corporate 
manslaughter by requiring that the way in which the organisation’s ‘activities are managed 
or organised by its senior management is a substantial element’ of the management 
failure.45 It looks to retain a significant focus on people by allowing the aggregation of 
individual failures by senior managers. 46  There is no search for one blameworthy 
individual, but individual behaviour still looks to be at the core of liability. The shift from 
management failure to senior management failure marks a potential break with the pre-
legislative history of the Act. 
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The significant changes introduced between the inception of the idea of reforming 
corporate manslaughter and the introduction of the law in its final form may be seen to 
mark a shift away from the organisational and a return to liability that is individualist, albeit 
not focused on any one individual. Individual behaviour is instead aggregated together, and 
this aggregate operates as a stand-in for the organisation in much the same way an 
individual would do under the identification doctrine. Such an approach assumes that 
senior managers, as those with the most power and control within the organisation, best 
represent the overall direction of that organisation.47 They are therefore the individuals who 
may be most appropriately taken to stand for the organisation. The proxy relationship has 
survived, on this interpretation of the 2007 Act. 
The aggregative interpretation of liability in light of the senior management 
requirement creates two distinct categories of corporate fault: that originating from senior 
managers, and from maverick workers. 48  The personal failures of those deemed 
sufficiently senior within the organisation take priority, with those operating at a lower 
level only able to contribute to such failings. An implicit assumption of those who may 
stand for the organisation has been created, creating a category of those with whom the 
organisation may be identified. 
This interpretation of the senior management requirement represents a 
continuation, albeit in a slightly expanded form, of the identification doctrine. The change 
is only in how specific the identification taking place need be: more than one senior 
manager can be considered to stand for the organisation, and their independent actions need 
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not reach the standard of criminal negligence.49 Only the sum total of behaviour need 
amount to a gross breach, and in this sense the Act is a move forward from the identification 
doctrine. It is an acknowledgement of the roles multiple individuals can have in corporate 
misconduct, and of the frequent importance of far more than just one individual within any 
large organisation.  
Viewed as an aggregative approach to corporate liability, liability under the 2007 
Act would, like the identification doctrine that preceded it, be a model of liability by proxy. 
The 2007 Act allows for aggregation of fault of individuals across the organisation.50 
Nevertheless, senior managers must play a substantial role in this fault. Organisations are 
liable on this approach only because of individuals committing misconduct who are 
sufficiently important to the organisation for their fault to be equated with corporate fault. 
This interpretation of the Act is only a limited move to simply allow the consideration of 
more than one individual. 
With only a limited move to aggregating individual fault, when treated in this way 
the senior management requirement imposes problematic constraints on liability. The 
senior management test can accommodate consideration of several senior corporate 
members, but it cannot accommodate either the reality of organisational fault, or the 
practical consequences of relying on individuals to stand for organisations. The 2007 Act 
is an ugly hybrid of individualist corporate liability and acceptance of organisational 
culpability.51  
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 B. The Challenges of Categorising Senior Managers as Corporate Proxies 
The potential focus on aggregated individual fault has not yet arisen as an obstacle to 
conviction in court, as the Act has been used only to prosecute small companies.52 The 
organisations prosecuted so far consist of no more than a grouping of close-knit 
individuals, or even one individual. Such cases present no problem of identifying 
individuals, and no additional element added by any overarching organisation. Prominent 
individuals take the lead and liability rooted in their acts is unrestrictive. 
The straightforwardness of convictions obtained under the new law belies the 
practical problems created by the senior management requirement. The impact of the 2007 
Act has been severely diminished as a result of police reluctance to charge organisations 
with manslaughter, largely due to uncertainty over what needs to be proved, and against 
who. 53  The prevalent understanding of the senior management requirement has 
discouraged prosecution, and undermined the efficacy of the new law.54 
The sentencing guidelines accompanying the Act demonstrate a focus on large 
organisations, suggesting that fines ‘will seldom be less than £500,000 and may be 
measured in millions of pounds’, but this initial intent has not been reflected in cases 
prosecuted to date.55 The six sentences handed down so far have all fallen considerably 
below the guideline minimum fine of £500,000, in large part because they have been 
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limited by the assets of the small companies convicted. 56  The new law of corporate 
manslaughter has been restrictively applied to prosecute ‘small limited companies with a 
hands-on senior management structure’, preventing the Act from achieving its goal of 
prosecuting large organisations for corporate killings.57 
If prosecutors turn to larger corporations, as they must surely do if the aims of the 
Act are to be attained, the conceptual issues underlying the new law will take on new 
importance. The 2007 Act was conceived as a means of resolving the serious difficulties 
inherent in prosecuting large organisations for manslaughter; however, the new law is itself 
potentially undermined by an aggregative interpretation of fault in the senior management 
requirement. These difficulties are reflective of the problematic framing of the senior 
management test, but also indicate broader problems with the reliance upon individuals as 
proxies for organisations, and individual fault as a proxy for organisational culpability. 
The creation of a category of individuals assumed to be identifiable as the 
organisation is problematic. While at first glance it appears straightforward to create such 
a category, in practice the boundaries of senior management are unclear, and will always 
be open to abuse and evasion. With the possibility of different organisations implementing 
their own formal chains of command, there ceases to be any reliable means of identifying 
who can stand for the organisation.58 The senior management requirement may produce a 
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category of individuals to stand for the organisation, but it is not a fixed category, 
dependent instead upon job descriptions and complex questions of employment law.59 
Moreover, senior rank itself does not necessarily imply that senior managers will 
play large roles in corporate manslaughter. This produces a universal escape-clause for 
corporate liability: place junior staff in charge of operations that present a legal risk, and 
avoid the possibility of senior management’s substantial involvement.60 Fault by junior 
members cannot give rise to liability without the assistance of senior management fault. So 
long as senior management’s hands remain clean, the organisation will not be liable. 
The senior management requirement, in prescribing an unsettled and easily avoided 
category of individuals as the identifiers of corporate liability, risks undermining the 2007 
Act’s capacity for holding organisations to account for corporate manslaughter. Its 
complexity makes prosecution difficult and avoidance easy.  
 
C. The Problems of Aggregative Corporate Liability 
Beyond the problems of the senior management requirement lie even more fundamental 
difficulties arising from the use of individuals as proxies for corporate fault. This is for two 
related reasons. First, individual wrongdoing is sometimes hard to find, even when a large 
number of individuals are taken into consideration, and second, corporate wrongdoing will 
often be more than the sum of individual wrongdoing. 
Individually culpable actors are difficult to find within organisations, and in some 
cases may not exist at all. 61  Identifying responsible individuals becomes increasingly 
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difficult as organisations grow. It is often impossible to precisely define individual 
contributions to corporate outcomes. Even in the realm of senior management, individual 
contributions to the wrongful outcome in question may be difficult to identify. An 
individualist, even when aggregative, model of liability will always be undermined because 
of this. The nature of the organisation is that it produces corporate, not individual, 
outcomes. This hides individuals behind the organisation. We cannot always tell what 
exactly happened, or who did what, while individual actors are hidden under corporate 
shrouds.62 As such, we are unable to identify the faulty actor, or even actors, whose failings 
may stand as those of the organisation. 
Individual action is extremely difficult to pinpoint in corporate settings. Moreover, 
even when individuals can be identified as having made some contribution to the faulty 
outcome, there may be no individual fault to be found. Multiple innocent actions, when 
combined within a corporate context, can produce consequences for which we wish to 
assign fault, to blame and punish, but for which no individual is in any way culpable. 
Corporate misconduct may arise from the interaction of blameless individuals that takes 
place within an organisation, and nothing more. It can be a product not of action, but of the 
effect organisations have in bringing those actions together. Even with individual actors in 
plain view, there may be no fault to identify or aggregate as corporate. 
If the capsize of the Herald is considered within the framework of the 2007 act, 
then the limitations of aggregative corporate liability come to the fore. If aggregated senior 
management fault is deemed necessary as a substantial element of the wrongful conduct of 
the organisation, then it is difficult to identify what those failings would be. This is not due 
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to any obliqueness of managerial roles or contributions within Townsend Thoresen, but 
instead due to the fundamental problem with aggregative liability: the inability of 
individual conduct to account for the full extent of corporate criminality. 
The Herald capsized in part because of fault by individuals. The crew made 
mistakes in performing their roles, and in developing the guidelines that defined those roles 
so too did senior managers. 63  However, the contribution of individual failings to the 
disaster borders on insignificance when compared to the magnitude of systemic failures 
within Townsend Thoresen. Crew operated within routines that were both narrow and 
uncertain in scope and execution.64 At management level, the structure of corporate roles 
reduced awareness of problems and diminished the perceived need to resolve them.65 
Between management and crew there existed critical failures of communication, with the 
ensuing differing expectations and standards leading to apathy at all levels.66 It was these 
systemic failures that were the substantial cause of the Herald’s capsize – not fault by 
individuals. 
The insufficiency or absence of fault by individuals in some cases of corporate 
misconduct points to the shortfall between the acts of individuals and corporate outcomes. 
Some events are not attributable simply to individuals or groups. Some actions, for example 
major disasters, are not achievable by individuals acting alone. They are the product of the 
interaction of contributions by many different actors, who each bear little, or even none, of 
the blame themselves. It is crucial to realise that this interaction would be impossible 
without the organisation facilitating and creating these interactions. Tragedies such as the 
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capsizing of the Herald may be the product not of any failures by individuals, but of a fault 
at the organisational level. The effect of the organisation in bringing together action may 
result in blameworthy outcomes for which no individual has any personal responsibility.67  
Corporate crime can never fully be captured by the acts of individuals, even 
aggregated together. Organisations have a greater effect upon the world than the sum total 
of their individual members’ actions. Corporate fault is not fault by one individual; nor is 
it fault by a collection of individuals. Individuals are part of corporate culpability, but their 
fault is never equal to that of the organisation.68 Corporate crimes are the product of more 
than just actions by individuals: they result from the way the organisation functions at an 
institutional level.69 Individuals within organisations may both act in ways that they would 
not otherwise have done if not pressed by corporate pressures, and their actions may have 
consequences that would not have arisen were it not for the corporate context. 
People act differently when within organisations. The choices they make are a 
product both of their own determinations and the environment within which they are acting. 
Individuals engage in acts they would avoid in the absence of corporate pressure.70 They 
engage in thought and action in response to the stimuli they are faced with, while 
‘individual characteristics, cognition, affect, and behaviour are constrained by their 
context’.71 All individual behaviour takes place within a context, and both the intentions 
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and actions of individuals are a product of this context as much as they are a product of the 
determinations made within it. 
At the same time, the outcomes of these decisions are moulded by the corporate 
context. The same decision becomes very different within an institutional context, one 
which can either greatly enhance or diminish the impact and scope of individual acts. 
Falling asleep while assigned to safeguard a door is one thing, but to do so against the 
backdrop of organisational neglect can expand the consequences of one individual’s acts 
far beyond their original scope.72 
Organisations have the capacity to shape the course of individuals’ acts, both at the 
point at which decisions are being taken, and when those decisions are having an effect 
upon the world. The overarching presence of an organisation hides individual fault, but it 
also adds an additional element to behaviour in the corporate context, with the effect that 
a model of corporate liability that focuses only on the people within the organisation will 
never capture the full extent of fault and blame arising in instances of corporate 
manslaughter. The senior management requirement, as it has been interpreted to this point, 
is not only practically flawed by its insistence upon a category of identifying individuals. 
It is also conceptually undermined by the insistence upon individuals being identified as 
the organisation in order to ground liability. 
With the focus on individual fault comes an inability to capture the extent of 
corporate culpability in the kinds of events that the 2007 Act was conceived as a response 
to. Tragedies such as the sinking of the Herald were the result of corporate failure, not just 
individuals failing. Without acknowledgement of the independent importance of the 
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organisation as more than just a collection of individuals, we cannot complete the picture 
of who – or rather what – is to blame. In situations where organisational failure makes up 
the whole picture – where systemic fault is such that no individual is in any meaningful 
sense to blame – we are left without any liability at all.73 There is a need to incorporate the 
organisation into the framework of corporate manslaughter liability, to achieve the original 
aims of the 2007 Act and capture precisely what is corporate about corporate culpability. 
 
4. Identifying the Additional Dimension of the Organisation 
 
The Herald capsized because the assistant bosun slept while he should have been attending 
to the bow doors. However, alongside individual failings, there was a faulty process on 
board the Herald. The standing orders issued to the Herald’s crew enabled and encouraged 
mistakes.74 Other officers and crew came to view their roles narrowly. Another crewman 
working close to the bow doors, despite seeing that there was no one there to close the 
doors, stated ‘It has never been part of my duties to close the doors or make sure anybody 
is there to close the doors.’75 He did neither, and while this may represent a mistake on his 
own part, it is also reflective of a faulty corporate process at work. Moreover, beyond 
narrow roles, there were uncertain routines for performing those roles together.76 Crew and 
officers did not know exactly what they needed to do, but thought that they did not have to 
do much. The organisation of the crew and officers created a situation that allowed for the 
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doors to be left open and unsupervised.77 The established procedures in place created the 
context for the disaster. 
Beyond the crew of the Herald, the managers of Townsend Thoresen themselves 
made mistakes that contributed to the disaster, but they, like the crew of the Herald, worked 
within an environment that contributed to, and enhanced the impact of, those mistakes. 
Members of the management team were detached from responsibility that they needed to 
take, over matters such as specifying the duties of the Herald’s officers.78 Due to the way 
in which roles were structured at the level of management, there existed a responsibility 
‘vacuum’.79 At the same time, the modes of communication within Townsend Thoresen 
prevented individuals from recognising the need for change. Despite officers frequently 
sending memos expressing concern over the way in which ships were operated, one 
member of management stated in evidence that if an officer had been genuinely concerned 
by a problem with the operation of the ships ‘he would have come in and banged on my 
desk’. 80  The expectations and standards of communication differed greatly between 
management and crew, leading to apathy at both levels. This apathy, in part, caused the 
disaster. 
There is no doubting that the action, and inaction, of a number of employees of 
Townsend Thoresen contributed to the Herald’s capsize and the subsequent loss of life. 
However, beyond any individual, Townsend Thoresen itself had a significant role in the 
tragedy. The corporation established a system within which its employees worked. As can 
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be seen, that system had an internal structure of processes that determined the way in which 
things were done, and this created the context for the disaster. 
 
A. The Authority of Corporate Structures 
At the core of any corporate entity is the contract between the employing organisation and 
the employee, who agrees to follow direction in exchange for remuneration. 81  The 
individuals who work for organisations enter into authority relationships, through which 
their acts are directed. Organisations can direct employees on when they work, what work 
they do and how they do it.82  
The authority of organisations imposes a system of work: a context within which 
employees operate. Individuals do not just work for organisations: they work within them. 
The employer status of organisations is such that, alongside the relationship in law between 
organisation and individual, there is a relationship of authority in fact. Organisations are 
not simply legal constructs, but employers, establishing authoritative systems of work with 
control over the context in which their employees act. 
As a part of this system, inherent in all large organisations, is a corporate structure. 
This includes the formal setting of the organisation: the rights and duties of different 
members to act independently, and how group members are organised, evaluated and 
awarded.83 The pressure of the organisation is not necessarily expressed through coercion, 
or threats. The mob, a large corporation, or any other organisation may impose its authority 
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through the offer of positive benefits for acting in a particular way.84 Money is not the only 
possible incentive; rewards may instead include ‘corner offices, parking places, dining 
room privileges, and the like’.85 
Corporate structure can exist in codes, rules, or guidance; in remuneration, 
promotion or firing schemes; or in the way in which these processes are imposed and 
monitored.86 Alongside formalised corporate practices, procedures and policies, corporate 
structure may also be both informal and unwritten, yet remain embedded in the 
organisation. Structure extends far beyond what is written down.87 There may be particular 
language used to frame issues, or informal implicit requirements or goals.88 Corporate 
structure can include the means, or lack thereof in organisations like Townsend Thoresen, 
of communication between corporate members.89 Organisations may not explicitly tell 
individuals what to do, but informal structures can still cause individual perceptions and 
decisions to fall in line with organisational standards.90 Informal structural constraints can 
determine the importance and meaning of rules or codes, or of job descriptions, and may 
even contradict those put forward officially as corporate practice.91 
Whether formally expressed or not, corporate structure can be observed as part of 
the corporate system of work. Its effects may be seen in ‘technology, office layout, manner 
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of dress, visible or audible behaviour patterns, and public documents such as charters, 
employee orientation materials, stories’. 92  The origins of such policies, practices and 
procedures may be traced back to the organisation, a system of work that implements a 
corporate structure into the context of employee action. 
The pressures imposed by corporate structure are not always formal or explicit, and 
they may at first glance seem trivial, but even implied insistence on a dress code can change 
the way people think and behave. Enforcing the adoption of a single corporate uniform can 
have significant effects upon the choices of those wearing corporate attire.93 Whether 
formally expressed or not, corporate structure establishes an environment that can change 
the behaviour of employees. The structure of an organisation can both encourage and 
impede the actions of corporate members. 
Corporate structure determines the context in which individual employee action 
takes place. Through this context, the organisation expresses its values, norms, basic ideas 
and mode of operations.94 By controlling the context of employee action, the organisation 
coerces compliance with corporate goals and aims. It imposes pressure upon employees, 
implicitly or explicitly, changing actors’ perceptions or understanding of what they should 
or should not do. Corporate structure is capable of constructing a ‘psychic prison’, an 
environment in which the organisational standards imposed overbear individual 
autonomy.95 Individual autonomy is in this way bounded by organisational structure.96 
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The corporate system of work imposes a system of behaviour upon employees 
within organisations. 97  Acts furthering corporate goals are required as a condition of 
employment.98 The choices available to an actor diminish, and he is pushed down paths as 
he is constrained by the authoritative environment of the organisation. 99  Corporate 
structure can define both the boundaries, and the direction, of the actions to be taken within 
the organisation.100 Individuals are pressured to act in accordance with ‘organizational 
goals and interests’, as determined from an organisational perspective. 101  Decisions 
become the product not of individual perceptions, but of the organisation’s implicit or 
explicit priorities. 
Corporate structure alters the perceptions of individuals working within its bounds. 
It controls the boundaries of interpretation and understanding within the organisation, 
changing the reasons individuals have to act and thereby changing their actions. 102 
Individual perceptions are altered, such that corporate goals become personal aspirations, 
to be attained in accordance with the organisation’s practices. Within the psychic prison of 
the organisation a ‘moral microcosm’ forms.103 In this way, corporate structure determines 
individual behaviour.104 
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Corporate structure is not a collection of individual contributions, or ‘built’ by 
individuals. It builds itself, adapting to pressures imposed both by individuals and social 
context.105 It responds to pressures from outside as well as within the organisation, by 
directing the behaviour of individuals through the creation of a context for action.106 When 
actors are operating in such a context then their acts are not only the product of their own 
decisions. They are also a product of the system of work in which those decisions were 
taken.107 Structure drives and determines individual behaviour, establishing the explicit 
involvement of the organisation in corporate crime. 
Corporate structure changes the relationship between the organisation and its 
members. Individuals operating within the organisation act not only for the organisation: 
they also act because of it. The behaviour of corporate members is directed and controlled 
by formal guidance, informal procedures and the composition of authority within the 
organisation.108 Organisations are potentially culpable directors of acts by individuals. 
Criminal liability arises from a criminal act, but its reach is not limited solely to the 
actor himself. One can be criminally responsible for an action on the basis that one directed, 
rather than performed, the act in question. Criminal liability for a death is not always a 
product of pulling the trigger. Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence is just 
as indictable as actually committing that offence.109 Individuals become liable in this way, 
and so may organisations. Liability as a counsellor is a product of one’s authority over the 
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triggerman, making it possible to be guilty of homicide without directly killing, solely on 
the basis that one counselled the commission of the offence.110 
Corporate structure need not insist upon death, for whenever a killing is within the 
scope of one’s instruction or authorisation, counselling an offence renders one a principal 
party in that crime.111 Organisations, through their corporate structures, direct individuals 
to engage in acts with the potential to cause death. As directors, organisations commit 
manslaughter in their own right, without regard to any individual fault. 
Organisations are independently culpable. Their liability would not arise without 
employees, but rather than acting as a proxy for organisations, individuals may be treated 
a conduit through which the directorial liability of the organisation is channelled. There is 
no need to identify those who stand for the organisation, or to search for aggregated 
individual fault. Organisations may be criminally liable for the effects their structures, 
which derive their power from the system or work that the organisation imposes as an 
employer, have in determining the direction and boundaries of individual action. The task 
now is to interpret the senior management requirement of the 2007 Act in this light, and to 
find a purpose for the test against the backdrop of the possibility of corporate culpability. 
 
B. Realigning the Senior Management Requirement 
The senior management requirement operates as a limit on corporate liability for 
manslaughter. Both where this boundary lies, and what considerations it has regard to, must 
be reassessed in light of the potential of organisations to commit manslaughter without the 
need for an identifying individual. Previously, the test has been seen as a means of defining 
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those individuals who could be identified as standing for the organisation. With corporate 
structure brought to the fore, senior management may instead be recognised as a means of 
defining policies, practices and procedures that are corporate, rather than incidental to the 
organisation. 
Not everything that dominates within an organisation is corporate, in the sense that 
it is part of the system of work within the organisation. Corporate culture is corporate in so 
far as it exists within the corporate entity, but it does not necessarily originate in the 
corporate system.112 Corporate culture is a product of what goes on between individuals, 
of the relationships and interactions between members. Some of these cultural traits will 
be bottom-up, emerging from the acts of individuals.113 They will have no structural origin, 
and as a result the culture of an organisation may not be attributable to the structures of 
that organisation. It may instead flow from the dominance of a particular individual.114 
Alternatively, it may be a product of the interactions and relationships between group 
members.115 
Corporate culture describes the pressures that originate, and are felt, as a 
consequence of group-level value emergence and identification.116 Their influence is a 
product of identification with the group, rather than direction by structure.117 While the 
pressures that corporate culture imposes may overlap with those imposed by corporate 
structure, corporate culture is incidental to the corporate context. Corporate culture is not 
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part of the corporate system of work. It is not a matter of corporate responsibility, but of 
group responsibility. 
Corporate responsibility is concerned with the overarching structure, implemented 
from above, that governs those interactions. It exists outside, and above, groups.118 The 
importance of the organisation in relation to its responsibility is the context it, through the 
imposition of a system of work, creates. 119  Group dynamics occur incidental to the 
corporate context, changing the way individuals interact. Groups modify our interactions 
with one another, but corporate structure sets the rules for and boundaries of these 
interactions. Corporate systems impose overarching structural pressures and constraints, 
whereas group dynamics are interpersonal.120 Only the former are truly corporate, rather 
than incidental to the corporate context. Corporate policies, practices and procedures are 
those that are embedded by a process of acceptance, whether active or passive, by senior 
corporate members. 
When holding organisations responsible, there is a need to identify what is truly 
corporate. With this need in mind, the senior management requirement may be seen not as 
an awkward addition to the law, but as an essential requirement for preventing corporate 
responsibility from extending beyond the corporate and into the incidental. Senior 
managers, within the meaning of the act, are those who make decisions about, or participate 
in, managing or organising the organisation.121 Requiring their substantial involvement in 
the corporate offence need not imply that they be involved as faulty actors, but instead may 
be interpreted as an acceptance of their necessary involvement in corporate structure. 
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Corporate structure is not limited by its initial design.122 However, that which is 
corporate will always require a level of adoption or toleration that only senior members of 
an organisation are in a position to engage in. If practices are to become embedded at the 
corporate, rather than group, level, they must receive institutional acceptance. They must 
become embedded as corporate values, and in considering how this may occur the role of 
senior members of organisations comes to the foreground. Whether through explicit 
adoption or informal toleration, senior members of a corporation play a central role in the 
institutionalisation of the processes and constraints that go on to become part of the 
corporate system of work. The senior members of an organisation define rules and select 
members, establishing the basis for future structural evolution.123 They are central to the 
adoption of procedures, policies, and practices into the corporate structure.124 
In building its own structures, the corporate system of work is an autonomous and 
independent entity. However, every building has architects and surveyors who direct and 
oversee structure. Such individuals play substantial contributory roles in the development 
of structures. Just as physical structures have architects and surveyors, so too do corporate 
structures. It is in occupying these roles that senior managers take on substantial roles in 
corporate systemic fault. Corporate structure implies architects and surveyors: members of 
senior management who play a significant role, whether active or passive, in the 
development and oversight of the corporate system of work.125 
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C. Testing for Corporate Structure with the Senior Management Requirement 
The argument has sometimes been made that corporate liability under the new Act derives 
from individual fault and culpability.126 In light of the capacity of organisations to be 
independently at fault and culpable, this need not be the case. Individual behaviour enables 
corporate culpability, but individual fault is no longer a prerequisite for a finding of 
corporate liability. 
Senior managers, within the meaning of the act, are those who make decisions 
about, or participate in, managing or organising the organisation. 127  Requiring their 
substantial involvement in the corporate offence does not imply that they be involved as 
faulty actors, and may instead be interpreted as an acceptance of their necessary 
involvement in corporate structure. The senior management test will necessarily always 
involve individuals, but need not be a test of individual fault. 
Instead, the senior management test may be viewed in light of the need to 
distinguish between corporate structure and that which is incidental to the corporate 
context. It can be a means of removing group and individual factors from the picture, 
concentrating instead on the role of the organisation itself. Senior management failure is a 
form of management failure, and need not imply any move into individual liability as a 
condition of organisational liability. 128  Senior management establish and oversee the 
blueprint of the corporate structure. Though this structure extends far beyond senior 
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managers’ input, those managers will always have an architectural or oversight role in the 
creation or toleration of corporate structure.129 
Central to the senior management requirement is not the managers themselves, but 
how they manage or organise the organisation, such that ‘how the activities were managed 
or organised by senior management must be a substantial element of the gross breach’.130 
The importance of senior managers, in the context of the Act, is their role in ‘conceiving, 
formulating, approving and implementing corporate policies’ that form a substantial part 
of the offence.131 Senior management is defined by reference to the having of significant 
roles in determining the trajectory of the organisation: in making decisions about how it is 
managed or organised, and engaging in such management and organisation.132  Senior 
managers are not classified as such because of their particular designated title, but by 
reference to their role within the organisation, their capacity to oversee and change the 
course of its policies. 
The powers and control that define senior management equate to the capacity to 
make architectural decisions and occupy surveyor’s roles. Senior managers are able to 
determine not only their own goals or those of subordinates, but also organisational goals. 
They do so by institutionalising the processes, policies, and procedures that make up 
corporate structure. Senior managers of organisations are defined not by their formal 
position within the organisation, but by reference to their architectural and oversight roles. 
Senior managers are individuals empowered to make decisions about the organisation. 
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Through their management oversight and control, senior managers are in a position 
to supervise and direct, with action or inaction, whether intentionally or through 
inattention, the trajectory of the organisation. They control the foundations of corporate 
structure, and in this way delineate the boundaries of corporate liability for manslaughter. 
Their contributions represent a substantial element of culpable corporate structure. 
The senior management requirement functions without regard to the presence or 
absence of misconduct by senior managers themselves. The 2007 Act requires the 
management and organisation of corporate activities by senior management to be a 
substantial element of the offence, but does not specify the necessary manner of this 
involvement.133 There is no requirement within the act for the individuals who make up 
senior management to contribute to any criminal act, so long as senior management 
remains a substantial element of the corporate crime. There is no requirement that senior 
managers are at fault, or that corporate liability derives from the aggregated culpability of 
individuals. 
Senior managers themselves need not be substantially involved in events giving 
rise to corporate manslaughter liability, which ceases to be matter of aggregating the 
misconduct of senior management members. It is not the members of senior management 
themselves that matter, nor any fault on their part, but rather their characteristic 
involvement as architects and surveyors that facilitate development of corporate structure. 
Through occupying these roles, members of senior management have a significant and 
substantial role in corporate crime.134  
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With this interpretation of the senior management requirement, the Corporate 
Manslaughter Act becomes a model of corporate culpability. The liability of an 
organisation is indicated by the involvement of individuals who play a particular role, and 
have particular significance, within that organisation. When corporate structure, marked 
by the involvement of senior management, causes death, the organisation is liable. When 
corporate structure alters the decisions of individual employees, it becomes capable of 
causing them to act in a way that causes death. Corporate manslaughter liability arises 
when the way in which the organisation is managed or organised causes death. 135 
Corporations are liable due to the effect of the system of work on individual action, with 
no further causal link required. There is no need to enquire into the fault of individuals, 
whether senior manager or otherwise.136 
The resulting corporate liability is posited not on corporate culture or individuals 
fault incidental to the corporate context, but on the directorial role of organisations. Senior 
managers establish, direct and supervise the corporate structure that enables organisations 
to determine the action of others. Organisations are liable for the acts they facilitate, direct 
and induce. Senior management’s statutory significance is that their architectural and 
supervisory involvement provides evidence of a culpable corporate structure. 
Understood in this way, the senior management requirement restricts corporate 
responsibility, but does so in a way that emphasises the role of the corporate entity. What 
matters, under the new test, is how activities are ‘managed or organised’ by senior 
management – not the senior managers themselves.137 This strikes the contrast between the 
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corporate and the group, not between high-up and low-down individuals, but between 
bottom-up and top-down pressures and constraints. The senior management requirement 
allows for the identification of what is truly corporate. It distinguishes the corrupt 
organisation from the ‘organisation of corrupt individuals’.138 
This approach brings a far more flexible scheme of liability, immune to the 
complexities of employment law and the complications of role definition within 
organisations. With the focus on roles, rather than titles, job descriptions become irrelevant. 
Once the inherent involvement of senior management at the architectural and oversight 
level is recognised, then even a junior member’s running of corporate activities can be 
traced back to the organisation, through the contributions of senior managers and into the 
faulty corporate environment in which that junior was operating. 
The framework of corporate structure highlights the contributions of senior 
managers, corporate structures and acting employees to corporate misconduct. Both the 
origins and effects of culpable corporate structure are easily observed. At Enron, for 
example, rules concerning ‘role modelling, allocation of rewards and criteria for selection 
and dismissal’ emanated from senior management into Enron’s corporate structure, 
enabling and encouraging ‘lying, cheating and stealing’ across the company.139  These 
significant effects offer a basis of culpability and liability, both for structural traits and 
architectural contributions. 
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Awareness of the culpability of corporate structure enhances the picture of the 
responsibility of and within organisations. Senior managers, as corporate architects and 
surveyors, take on newfound responsibility by virtue of their duties to regulate the 
corporate system of work. Senior members of an organisation are responsible for the 
development of organisational policies, practices and procedures that underlie corporate 
structure.140 Senior managers of organisations are placed in positions of responsibility. 
They govern a dangerous environment, and are responsible for fulfilling their architectural 
and oversight roles in doing so. The senior members of an organisation may be responsible 
both for developing, and failing to develop, corporate structure. The culpability of 
corporate structure implies culpable senior managers. 
Treating senior management as evidence of corporate culpability is in line with the 
original intent of the Commission in developing a new law of corporate manslaughter. The 
intended question was to be of whether there was management failure as distinct from 
‘blameworthy conduct on the part of any individual or group of individuals which should 
be attributed to the company’.141 Support for this approach can be seen throughout the Act: 
the focus of the offence is the manner in which the organisation’s activities are organised, 
with the jury able to consider the existence of ‘attitudes, policies, systems or accepted 
practices’ that could have encouraged or produced tolerance of management failure.142 
A concept of corporate culpability is consistent with the judicial direction taken so 
far in the limited case-law concerning the 2007 Act. Judicial interpretation corresponds 
with the theoretical model proposed here, as in R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd,143 
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in which the defendant corporation was convicted for ‘manslaughter causing death as a 
result of a gross breach of duty following a system of work which was demonstrably, and 
for some time had been, unsafe, with the potential for causing death’.144 Corporate liability 
has been treated as a product not of individual fault, but of a faulty system of work. 
With this interpretation, cases exhibiting similar attributes to the capsize of the 
Herald may be regarded as clear instances of corporate criminal liability for manslaughter. 
The system of work at the centre of that disaster is brought to the fore, and its significant 
contributions to individual failings are recognised as the origins of corporate manslaughter.  
Through acknowledgement of senior managers as architects and surveyors, senior 
management involvement may continue to be used as evidence of systemic failure. This is 
not a failure by an individual or group of individuals, but a systemic failing that has its 
scope circumscribed by the involvement of certain individuals, as architects and surveyors 
of a system of work. Only by recognising the senior management requirement as pointing 
to the structural constraints and pressures of organisations is it possible to succeed in 
capturing the responsibility of organisations. Only this approach will succeed in truly 
broadening the net of corporate liability.145  
 
5. Structural Failure, Corporate Culpability, and a New Role for Senior 
Management 
 
With the arrival of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 comes 
a new means of approaching the criminal liability of organisations. There is the potential 
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for a significant shift away from the individualist history of corporate liability, towards a 
model that reflects the role and responsibility of organisations.  It allows for the 
consideration of organisational liability as something held by the organisation: not just by 
its members. The risk, however, is that the new law is interpreted in an overly restrictive 
manner, and constrained to consideration of aggregated individual fault. Such an approach 
would undermine the aims of the Act, rendering the new law almost as unhelpful as its 
predecessor and fraught with complications. 
There is space, however, for consideration of the 2007 Act as more than just a 
means of attributing individual conduct to organisations. It may be recognised as a move 
towards recognising the participation of senior managers as a marker for a distinctly 
corporate culpability.146 The role of the senior management requirement need not be used 
to identify individual failure, but to define the limits of organisational failure. Individuals 
remain important to corporate liability, but only in so far as they indicate the boundaries of 
corporate structure. Senior managers matter not because they represent the organisation, 
but because they are the architects and surveyors of its structure. Organisations are not 
liable because of individuals, but due to the directorial role of their authoritative structures. 
Certain individuals demarcate corporate structure, and the provisions of the new Act focus 
our attention on exactly those individuals: senior management. 
The test of senior management points not to a conceptual confusion, but instead to 
a narrow focus on the corporate, rather than the individual or group, by emphasising the 
architectural and oversight role of senior managers. With this interpretation, the Act 
becomes a powerful tool for the prosecution of corporate manslaughter, able to 
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accommodate the diversity of large organisations. The 2007 Act can encompass the full 
extent of corporate culpability. 
 
